The international legal basis for resolving conflict in the Syrian Arab Republic

On August 3, 2011 the Security Council issued a presidential statement that expressed profound regret over the hundreds of deaths in Syria, condemned widespread violations of human rights against civilians by Syrian authorities, and called for an immediate end to violence in Syria, urging all sides to act with utmost restraint. It also called for access for humanitarian workers for Syrian authorities to follow through on commitments they had made to reform.

On October 4, 2011 the Security Council failed to adopt a resolution that would have, among other things, voiced deep concern over violence in Syria and strongly condemned "the continued grave and systematic human rights violations and the use of force against civilians by the Syrian authorities.” It called for "an inclusive Syrian-led political process conducted in an environment free from violence, fear, intimidation and extremism, and aimed at effectively addressing the legitimate aspirations and concerns of Syria’s population.” Russia and China voted against the resolution, and Brazil, India, Lebanon, and South Africa abstained.

Russian Ambassador explained that his country did not support the regime of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad but the draft resolution would not promote a peaceful resolution of the crisis. He said the issue was not a question of wording, but "a conflict of political approaches” on how to end the crisis

China’s Ambassador Li Baodong said that while his country was highly concerned about the violence in Syria, the text as it stood would only complicate existing tensions. He said the draft was overly focused on exerting pressure on Syria, and included the threat of sanctions, which would not resolve the situation.

Also addressing the Council that day, Ambassador Bashar Ja’afari of Syria said the draft resolution reflected the biased attempts of some Western countries to undermine his country’s authorities. He said the legitimate needs and aspirations of the Syrian people had been misused by some domestic groups, with the support of foreign elements, to provoke external intervention.

On February 4, 2012 The Security Council failed to adopt a resolution that would have, among other things, adopted an Arab League plan outlining a Syrian-led political transition to a democratic, plural political system. The resolution had called on the Syrian government to cease violence against civilians, withdraw its armed forces from cities and towns and return them to their barracks, guarantee the freedom of peaceful demonstrations, and allow unhindered access for all Arab League institutions to "determine the truth about the situation on the ground and monitor the incidents taking place." Thirteen of the Council's 15 members voted in favour of a draft text submitted by Morocco, but China and Russia exercised their vetoes. Speaking after the vote, Russia's Ambassador Vitaly Churkin said the text as it stood "sent an unbalanced signal to the Syrian parties," with no call on the Syrian opposition to distance itself from extremist groups.

China's Ambassador Li Baodong voiced disappointment that the draft resolution did not incorporate amendments proposed by Russia, which China supported.He said an "undue emphasis" on pressuring Syria's authorities would prejudice the result of dialogue and only complicate the issue rather than ending the fighting. He said the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of Syria must be fully respected.

February 23, 2012 United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon and Secretary-General of the League of Arab States Nabil Elaraby appointed Kofi Annan as United Nations-League of Arab States Joint Special Envoy for Syria.

On March 21, 2012 the Security Council voiced grave concern at the deteriorating situation in Syria and called on its Government and opposition to immediately implement a plan proposed by the international envoy tasked with helping end the crisis in the Middle Eastern country.

In a presidential statement, the 15-member body expressed its full support for the efforts of the Joint Special Envoy of the United Nations and the League of Arab States for Syria, Kofi Annan, "to bring an end to all violence and human rights violations, secure humanitarian access and facilitate a Syrian-led political transition to a democratic, plural political system.”

On April 5, 2012 The Security Council issued another presidential statement that, among other things, noted the Syrian government commitment on March 25, 2012 to implement Kofi Annan’s six-point peace proposal. The statement also called upon the Syrian government to implement an U.N.-brokered cease-fire by withdrawing troops from population centers by April 10, 2012. It also called upon all parties, including the Syrian opposition, to cease all armed violence no later than April 12, 2012.[1]

On April 14, 2012, The Security Council passed Resolution 2042, which approved the deployment of a U.N. advance team of 30 military observers to Syria. It also demanded that the Syrian authorities withdraw security forces from population centers and begin a dialogue with the opposition. The vote marked the first time since protests began that the Security Council was united in demanding a halt to the violence.

On April 21, 2012, The Security Council passed Resolution 2043, which established—for a 90-day period—a United Nations Supervision Mission in Syria (UNSMIS) with an initial deployment of up to 300 unarmed military observers under the command of a Chief Military Observer. The resolution also created a civilian team to help implement elements of the full peace plan, such as the start of a national political dialogue and the government's granting of the right to demonstrate.

On 30 June 2012, the United Nations-backed Action Group on Syria forged an agreement outlining the steps for a peaceful transition in Syria. In the Final Communiqué, the Group called for all parties to immediately re-commit to a sustained cessation of armed violence, to fully cooperate with UN monitors, and to implement the six-point plan put forward by Mr. Annan without waiting for the actions of others. The Group also agreed on a set of principles and guidelines for a Syrian-led transition that meets the aspirations of the Syrian people, which includes the establishment of a transitional governing body that would exercise full executive powers and that would be made up by members of the present Government and the opposition and other groups.[2]

On July 19, 2012, the Security Council failed to adopt a proposed resolution that would have, among other things, threatened sanctions on Syria if demands to end the violence were not met. Permanent members China and Russia voted against the resolution and Pakistan and South Africa abstained. The resolution would have had the Security Council act under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter to demand verifiable compliance—within 10 days of the adoption—with its demands in previous resolutions that Syrian authorities pull back military concentrations from population centers and cease the use of heavy weaponry against them.

On July 20, 2012, the Security Council passed UNSCR 2059 which extended the UNSMIS mission for an additional 30 days. It also conditioned any further renewal of UNSMIS on the cessation of the use of heavy weapons by the government and a reduction in violence by all sides.

On August 2, 2012, United Nations-League of Arab States Joint Special Envoy for Syria, Kofi Annan announced his intention to resign when his mandate expires on August 31, 2012.

On August 31, 2012, Algerian diplomat Lakhdar Brahimi replaced K. Annan under an undetermined mandate and became the Joint Special Representative of the United Nations and the League of Arab States on the Syrian crisis.

Possible Scenarios

Recent events have renewed international debate about how rapidly President Asad’s government could be forced from power. Some observers initially believed in 2011 that the Asad regime would fall quickly, but many subsequent projections have warned against underestimating the regime’s staying power. A number of factors are shaping the relative prospects of the Asad government and the opposition, including:

•         The performance of the armed opposition on the battlefield, particularly in Aleppo and Damascus, and its ability to eliminate or attract members of President Asad’s inner circle;

•         The ability of various armed and political opposition groups to cooperate, agree on a common program, and maintain legitimacy in the eyes of Syrians and third parties;

•         The ability of the government to pay public sector salaries, ensure supplies of basic goods, and deliver services and utilities amidst economic sanctions and conflict;

•         The willingness of minority groups that so far have been either neutral or supportive of the government to join the ranks of the opposition;

•         The availability of outside military and financial assistance for the Syrian government and the opposition; and

•         The morale of the armed forces in the face of ongoing fighting and their brutal suppression campaign against civilians.

In this context, a range of scenarios and outcomes are possible, and are not mutually exclusive:

Imminent Regime Defeat? The rapid escalation of fighting in Damascus beginning on July and 15 and in Aleppo starting on July 21 fueled speculation that rebel fighters could force the collapse of the Asad government by seizing significant parts of these key cities andor assassinating or kidnapping additional high-level officials. The July 18 bombing that killed four high-level regime figures, including the President’s brother-in-law, dealt a major blow to the government and may have psychologically changed the narrative of the conflict in favor of the opposition. However, as of mid-August, the opposition’s withdrawal from neighborhoods in Damascus and the government’s ongoing assault on rebel-held areas of Aleppo indicate that the Asad regime has been wounded but not defeated.

An Enduring Conflict and State Collapse? Both sides could remain locked in armed conflict, unable to prevail, and unwilling to negotiate over power sharing. This scenario could lead to tens of thousands more casualties and mass civilian displacement before exhaustion settles in and negotiation ensues. Some observers have speculated that if conflict persists and state authority weakens further, Syria could splinter into Alawite, Sunni, Christian, and Kurdish enclaves, with mixed populations in urban areas divided by sectarian neighborhoods. Others have questioned whether ethnic and sectarian divisions will be the principal driver of state collapse, or whether local authority and organization will predominate, continuing the trend started by local opposition groups that have self-organized politically, economically, and even militarily. The prospect of partial or total state collapse poses serious security risks. Syrian weapon stockpiles could proliferate and security vacuums could present opportunities for transnational violent extremist groups to take root.

Rebel Versus Rebel? If the opposition fails to unify politically around either a civilian-led authority, military-led council, or both, competing rebel fighters may turn against each other prior to or after regime change. Should this occur, Syria’s civil war could devolve into a multi-faceted conflict, with competing groups prolonging the violence. Rebel militias could splinter along secular/Islamist divides or as rivalries develop between competing leaders.

A Military Coup d’Etat? The Asad regime is known for its intricate system of control over commanders in the military and intelligence apparatus, and many military leaders are linked by kinship ties. As of mid-August 2012, no members of the core Alawite leadership of the Asad regime had defected. Nevertheless, a military coup remains a remote possibility. Some military commanders, when faced with mounting battlefield losses and the prospect of defeat, may calculate that a move against the Asad family could be enough to salvage a place at the negotiating table during a transition process. The defection of General Manaf Tlass—one of the most senior officials to defect thus far— is already being hailed as a significant blow to the regime, and Tlass appears to be seeking to create a more unified military-led opposition council comprised of FSA leaders and newly defected military leaders.

A Negotiated Solution? As long as both the regime and its opponents seek total victory and envision a future Syrian government that excludes the other, a political settlement will remain elusive. On June 30, the Action Group on Syria endorsed the concept of a compromise agreement "formed on the basis of mutual consent” to create a national unity government, though what role the ruling Baath party would play in such a transition is uncertain.